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Achieving  water quality goals will necessitate  goals.  Second,  uniform  restrictions  achieve  a
adoption of best management  practices  (BMP's)  given  level  of total  abatement  at  a  higher  re-
by  some  or  all  farmers.l  Water  quality  is  ex-  source  cost than taxes on pollution emissions  or
pected to improve  as  farmers adopt BMP's  such  subsidies  on pollution abatement.  The fact  that
as  conservation  cropping  systems,  structural  soil  loss  standards  are  more  costly  (excluding
measures,  and  conservation  tillage  methods.  administrative  costs)  than  taxes  or  subsidies  is
Currently,  there  is  an  absence  of pollution  not  new (Randall,  pp.  174-75).  However,  some
abatement  incentives  strong  enough  to  induce  states  have  adopted  soil  loss  standards  (some
farmers  to  abate  sediment,  nutrients,  and  pes-  being  accompanied  by  cost-sharing  programs)
ticides to desirable  social levels. Although a spe-  and it appears that many other states may do the
cific  socially  optimal  level  of pollutants  may be  same (Harder et al.). An alternative policy to uni-
difficult  (or  impossible)  to  quantify,  the  U.S.  form restrictions, taxes,  and subsidies which has
Congress,  by  passing  the  Federal  Water  Pollu-  not usually been  considered  is one  in which re-
tion Control Act Amendments  of 1972 (P. L. 92-  strictions are  set at different  levels  for  different
500),  has  demonstrated  the  need  for  improve-  polluters.  The  argument presented  in this  paper
ments in  water  quality.  The  stated  goal of this  is that  a policy  imposing differential  restrictions
legislation is to eliminate discharges of pollutants  may, under certain conditions, be desirable when
into navigable waters by 1985.  This goal may not  efficiency  and equity aspects  are considered.
be achieved  in the allotted time period unless in-
centives  of  sufficient  magnitude  and  scope  One criterion for program acceptance might be centives  of  sufficient  magnitude  and  scope
evolve.  Since market forces in the private  sector  economic  efficiency-obtaining  the most  abate-
have  not  sufficiently  reduced  pollutant  emis-  ment  per  dollar  of costs.  The  optimum  level  of
sions,  public intervention  may be needed  to cre-  abatement  would occur at the point  where mar- ginal social  cost equals  marginal social benefit. ate  programs  that  will  alleviate  the  non-point  a  soa  ot e  s  social  benefit.
source pollution (NSP)  problem.  Possible pollu-  Costs  have  previously  been  measured  as  in-
tion  control  measures  include  regulation,  taxa-  creases  in  p  expenditures  (Alt  and
tion,  or  subsidization  of pollution  emissions  or  Heady;  Nicol et al.),  decreases  in net farm rve- nue (Kasal;  Forster and Becker),  and changes in reductions,  production practices,  or input usage.  cnsumers  plus p  roducers'  surpls  a  han 
Educational  programs  geared  toward  informing  nmers  plus  prod  rs  surplus  (ayloran Educational  programs  geared  toward  informing  Frohberg;  Osteen  and  Seitz).  Also,  direct  and both  the  public  and  farmers  about  the  benefits  eonry i  hae been  analyzed  (Palmini
and  costs  of various  pollution  abatement  mea-  secondary impacts  have been  analyzed  (Palmini and  costs of  various  pollution  abatement  mea-  et al.; Miller and Everett).  Benefits derived from sures  may  also be instigated.  Agricultural  econ-  e  al.  Mll a  nd  Everett).  Benefits derived from
omists have,  through various types  of analyses,  pollution  abatement (or costs  of pollution dm-
attempted toanti  e  t  he  e  c  ages)  have been estimated in a few studies  (Lee attempted  to  anticipate  the  economic  conse- uattempted  to  anticipate  the  economic  conse-  et al.,  1974a; Lee et al.,  1974b;  Narayanan et al., quences  of proposed  control measures.  Knowl- quences  of proposed  control  measures.  Knowl-  1974b).  Taylor et al,  1978,  attempted  to estimate
edge concerning  the amounts  and distribution of  1  yoret al,  1  ,  ttepted to estite
costs  and  benefits  of potential  programs  would  administrative  costs.  In  this  study,  only  de- creases  in net farm revenue are included as costs help policy-makers  determine the  socially  desir-  arm reee  are  de  s 
able program.  of pollution control.  No attempt was made to es-
Restricting  soil loss  on each  cropland acre  to  timate  administrative  costs,  abatement  benefits,
some specified level has generally  been the most  or secondary impacts. It is recognized,  however,
common policy  studied.  A policy of uniform soil  that proper measurement of such costs andbene-
loss  restrictions  (standards)  presents  two prob-  fits  is imperative  if society  is to  select  efficient
lems.  First,  as  Hurt  and  Reinschmiedt  among  programs  over more inefficient  ones.
others point out, reducing  erosion might reduce  Another criterion for policy acceptance  might
sediment,  but  may  not  achieve  water  quality  be  equity;  the  costs of  control should  be borne
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BMP  refers  to a practice  or combination  of practices  that  is determined  by  a state  or designated  areawide  planning  agency  to be  the  most efficient  and  practicable
(including  technological,  economical,  and institutional  considerations)  means  of controlling point  and nonpoint  pollutants at levels compatible  with environmental  quality
goals.
123equally  among the  polluters.2 Kasal  recognized  types, and  management  systems generate  differ-
that  distribution  of income  among  farmers  and  ent amounts of soil loss.  These factors  are  also
various  income groups  is important,  but did  not  important  in  determining  the  amounts  of  sedi-
consider  this  aspect  in  his  model.  Different  ment delivered  to  waterways.  Initially,  with no
policies could have different impacts on farmers,  sediment abatement (the origin), Farms  1, 2,  and
taxpayers,  and consumers.  Forster  and  Becker  3 deliver  OD1,  OD2, and OD 3 tons/acre  of sedi-
demonstrated  that farmers prefer subsidies, then  ment, respectively.3 Total basin delivery,  ODb, is
regulations,  and  finally  taxes,  while  taxpayers  the  sum  of the  individual  farm  deliveries.  As-
prefer  these  policies  in  opposite  order.  Taylor  sume each farm can, by adopting BMP's,  reduce
and  Frohberg concluded that an increase  in food  all  sediment deliveries  and  that the incremental
prices  would  be  more  harmful  to  low  income  costs of abating  sediment are directly related to
consumers than an increase in income taxes due  the  quantity  of sediment  abated.4 The  marginal
to the progressive nature of our tax system.  Mil-  costs  of  abatement  for  the  three  farms  are  the
ler and Gill examined the equity consequences  of  curves  MC1,  MC2,  and  MC3. The  horizontal
applying  two  different  NSP  control  policies.  summation  of these curves is the basin marginal
They found that effluent charges result in a more  cost of abatement,  MCb.
equal  distribution  of  net  income  losses  than  a  One  policy  may  be to  restrict per  acre  deliv-
statewide  soil loss standard applied to all farms.  eries  of  sediment  to  some  specified  amount
To the  extent that equity considerations  are  im-  (one-half ton per acre,  for instance).  If the  stan-
portant,  the most equitable policy would be pre-  dard  is  less  than  the  quantity  being  delivered,
ferred  over  other  policy  alternatives,  given  the  then the farm will have to reduce deliveries. The
same level of efficiency.  However, there may be  restriction level  is met when Farm  1 abates  OA
trade-offs  between  equity and efficiency.  (delivers  AD1) tons,  Farm 2 abates OC (delivers
The objectives  of this paper are:  (1) to demon-  CD2) tons, and Farm 3 abates OE (delivers  ED3)
strate  graphically  that restrictions  such  as  uni-  tons. Distances AD1, CD2, and ED3 are equal and
form  soil  loss  standards  are  less  efficient  and  represent  the  uniform  sediment delivery restric-
equitable  than  some  other  NSP  control  mea-  tion level applied to  each farm.  The total cost of
sures;  and  (2)  to  empirically  investigate  effi-  abatement  for  any  farm  is  the  area  under  the
ciency and  equity impacts  from various  policies  marginal  cost  curve between  the  origin  and  the
for a river basin in Georgia.  level of abatement.  Thus, Farm  1 has the lowest
total  costs  (OAA')  and  Farm  3 has  the  highest
total  costs  (OEE')  under  a uniform  restriction
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS  policy.
Within  the basin,  OF tons  of  sediment  have
The  efficiency  and  equity  aspects  of  restric-  been  abated,  leaving  deliveries  of  FDb,  an  ac-
tions, taxes,  and  subsidies are  illustrated in Fig-  ceptable level.  The quantity  OF equals the sums
ure 1  for three hypothetical farms in a river basin.  of OA,  OC, and OE while FDb equals AD1, CD2,
Farms having different topographic features,  soil  plus ED3. Efficiency and equity can, however,  be
improved by applying a tax per unit of delivery or
subsidy per unit  of abatement.  The  appropriate
$/  tax-subsidy  rate is  the vertical distance  between
^  ~~~~acre,,~  ~F  and  F'.  A  tax  of OX  $/ton/acre  will  induce
farmers to abate sediment  as long as the tax rate
MC /  /  is greater than the marginal cost of abatement.  A
3~/  /  ^MCS  subsidy of OX $/ton/acre will induce farmers to
MCZ  /E  y  ,  /.  abate as long as the marginal cost of abatement is
less than the subsidy rate.  Thus, the equilibrium
McP  levels of abatement are identical under either the
/  _--_ ^~  I  ...  __  ___  _tax  or subsidy  policy provided  there  are no  dif-
I//X  :  /  ~  \  ferences  in  transaction  costs  or income  effects.
AJ  ;~'^  I--^  !~  ;~  In this  example,  Farms  1, 2,  and  3 would  abate
DI  C  D—  E  C  )  F  Eb  OB,  OC,  and OD tons, respectively.
Tons/acre  of  ediment  abatement  Comparison of a tax-subsidy policy with a reg-
FIGURE  1.  Efficiency  and  Equity  Aspects  of  ulation  policy  reveals  some  important  results.
Restrictions  Versus  Taxes-Subsidies  Farm  1 abates  more  (delivers  less)  sediment,
Farm 2 abates an equal amount of sediment,  and
2 The definition  of equity used assumes only one type of societal value judgment.  In  some instances,  equity may imply that the costs of abatement should accrue  to those
who benefit from the improvement in water quality.  In other cases, an equitable  policy is one that distributes costs either in proportion to damages or by  ability to pay.  Much
debate  centers  on  the definition  of equity  when dealing  with economic  policies.  Just,  Hueth, and  Schmitz  state that ". .. equity has to  do with  how  equitable  goods are
distributed among  individuals." This circular definition is of little value  in forming a precise  meaning of equity. In this paper,  however, the most equitable policy is defined as
the one  resulting  in the most equal cost distribution  among farmers.  This  definition  is implied by Miller  and Gill,  also. The authors realize that other distributional  impacts
may  be important,  but  identifying them is beyond  the scope of this research.
In this  graph,  movements  from  left  to right represent  increases  in abatement and  decreases in emission.  As abatement increases,  emission decreases.
4 Costs of abatement  for this example  are defined  as losses  in  net farm revenue  accompanying  adoption of BMP's.  These costs  do not include  administrative  costs or
regional  income impacts.  They  only  represent  the costs to  the farm firms  of undertaking pollution  control practices.
124Farm  3 abates  less  (delivers  more)  sediment  costs.  This plan would be less  efficient than the
under a tax-subsidy policy than under a uniform  equi-marginal restrictions policy but might be de-
regulation  policy.  Also,  the  increased  costs  of  sirable  if equi-marginal  restrictions  resulted  in
Farm  1 are less than the reduced costs of Farm 3  "too  wide"  a  cost  distribution.  Policy-makers
(AA'B'B<DD'E'E).  Thus,  efficiency  is  in-  need  to evaluate  the relative  trade-offs  between
creased  with  a  tax-subsidy  policy  because  the  efficiency and equity.  The preceding discussions
total  basin  abatement  costs  are  reduced.  Also,  do  demonstrate  that  differential  restrictions
the  tax-subsidy  policy  is  more  equitable  since  applied  equi-marginally  are  more  efficient  and
costs  are  distributed  more  evenly  among  the  equitable  than  uniform  per  acre  restrictions
farms. Applying a tax-subsidy policy (identical to  applied to all farms. Administrative  costs may be
applying the  equi-marginal principle)  is  more ef-  different  under these  two policies. Both policies
ficient  and  equitable  than  applying a restriction  would require monitoring and enforcement at the
policy  as  long  as there  are differences  in either  firm level  but  differential  restrictions  would  re-
quantities  of pollution  delivered  or  marginal  quire  the  identification  of  restriction  levels  for
costs of abatement among farms.  each farm.  As this may require substantial costs,
In  discussing  the  tax-subsidy policies,  a  sec-  farms of similar erosion potential could be aggre-
ond aspect  requires  consideration.  A tax  policy  gated  into  separate  classifications.  Then  only
imposes  additional  costs  to  farmers  above  the  marginal  cost  of  abatement  functions  for  each
abatement  costs for those  units of pollution not  classification  would  be  estimated  to  obtain
abated.  Thus,  farmers  must  pay  taxes  for  the  equi-marginal  restriction  levels.  This  is,  in fact,
quantities of pollution delivered.  With a subsidy,  the  procedure  used in  the  empirical  analysis  of
taxpayers must pay for the quantities of pollution  this  study.
abated,  providing  a  net  gain to  farmers.  These
additional  costs  to  either  farmers  or  taxpayers
may  be  substantial.  An  alternative  policy  that  METHODOLOGY
would  avoid  these  additional  costs  may  be
needed.  One  possibility,  imposing  differential  A linear programming  model was developed to
standards  at  tax-subsidy  equilibrium  levels,  quantify the economic  and environmental quality
could  be  feasible  if  individual  marginal  cost  impacts  from  equal  restrictions  versus  differ-
curves could be estimated.  In this example, Farm  ential restrictions.  Analysis  of both solutions re-
1  would be restricted to BD1 tons/acre,  Farm 2 to  veals  the  efficiency  and  equity  aspects  of  the
CD2 tons/acre,  and  Farm  3 to  DD3 tons/acre.  proposed policies.
This  solution would  maintain  the  efficiency  and  The  model  includes  an  objective  function  to
equity properties of tax-subsidy policies without  maximize  annual  returns  to land,  management,
imposing  additional  costs  to  farmers  or  overhead,  and  risk.  Activities  were  either  crop
taxpayers.  Farmers would,  however, pay the as-  production, crop selling, or terrace construction.
sociated  pollution  abatement  costs  unless  cost-  Objective  function  coefficients  for  the  crop
sharing was  made available,  production  activities  were  the  negative  total
Iowa has enacted a sediment control law which  costs  of producing  one  acre  of that  crop.5 The
sets  different  soil  loss  limits  for  different  land  yields for  these crop  production  activities  were
classes.  However,  cost-sharing  assistance  is  transferred  to  the  selling  activities  and  sold  at
made available to the landowner to cover at least  1979 prices.  Unterraced  land  could become  ter-
75 percent of the cost of installing permanent soil  raced  at a specified  cost through  use of transfer
and  water  conservation  practices  (Greiner).  rows.  Objective function coefficients  for the ter-
Forster and  Becker used differential  soil loss re-  race  construction  activities  were  negative,  and
strictions based on the  soil loss tolerance factor  represented  the  cost  of  converting  unterraced
(T-value) in their model. These T-values vary be-  land to terraced  land  on  a per  acre  basis.  Cost
tween soil types and are used to approximate  the  and  yield estimates  were developed  from  infor-
ideal  standard  which  equates  marginal  costs  mation  provided  by the  Cooperative  Extension
across  all producers.  Soil  loss standards  set ac-  Service,  University  of  Georgia,  and  the  Soil
cording  to T-values  would be more efficient  and  Conservation Service.
equitable  than uniform  standards.  However,  the  The study area was the Altamaha  River Basin
problem  of  actual  sediment  delivery  and  other  in Georgia (Figure  2).  Sediment  delivery is more
forms  of pollutants  still  remains.  As  noted  be-  likely  to  occur  in  the  Piedmont  than  in  the
fore,  restricting  soil  loss  may  not  necessarily  Coastal  Plains  because  the  Piedmont  has  more
achieve the optimal level  of water quality,  erosive,  steeper  sloping  soils  and  a larger  sedi-
Differential restrictions  could be structured  so  ment delivery ratio. This basin was classified into
that all farmers pay identical pollution abatement  seven soil resource groups  (SRG's)  on the basis
5 This analysis  is based on the requirement that the firm invest in equipment. The ownership costs of equipment  were computed on an annual basis taking into account its
expected life.  These costs  plus variable  operating expenses  equal the total cost of producing one acre of each activity.  The programming solution assumes that the  optimal
farm organization  will  remain unchanged  over the  lifespan of the equipment.
125were estimated by using the Universal Soil Loss
/" .. ~;-.  f....-  SEDIMENT  PRODUCING
^^^  i  lo  {AREASODC  Equation  (Wischmeier  and  Smith).  Then  these
*_-^T  ,M'  \;  7  A1  High  Production  erosion  rates were  multiplied by a  sediment  de-
Medium  Production  livery ratio (SDR).  The  SDR's for the Piedmont
L.1/i  -5  ? [i  :i:\:::Low  Production  C  |  and  Coastal  Plains  SRG's were  .24  and  .10,  re-
7JFT-'"^  1^^^^--'^1~  fspectively  (Georgia Agriculture/Irrigation  Tech-
/\-j>°°-/  |/  7\8>  nical  Task  Force  Report,  1978).  Information
'~\~  '  ~s~' 'i:'  E-  t  ^'l  concerning  the actual levels  of sediment  in  wa-
'  l  yl  ,  -L\  terways  that  occur  when  selected  BMP's  are
- -'  /.  ;  ^^  '  used  on farms  was  not  available.  Thus,  the  re-
I^^l; \°X  ,  t/..  1  8  .. '  s  - u  suits  derived  from  these  models  may  over-  or
I  "7; S---oat  T>  I  S  A  l  under-estimate  the economic  and  environmental
y\-.~~-O/$i>^  x$3^~  /  -impacts  attributed to  each policy.
^  - rl  ^  ^  The  model  was  applied  to  three  situations.
j.:  f"  M^  ~  ^~ l  First, a baseline solution was obtained by leaving
sediment  delivery  unconstrained.  Second,  sedi-
\7^.-tQ-io_.ft  L.N  W^  ^  j-l^^  i  -ment  delivery in each SRG was constrained to an l  •"^-T  ^^^  so}|  average  of one-half ton per acre.7 This  situation
a -]^  w  ~  - _Cc  represents  the  equal  restriction  policy.8 Third,
C  j  -^•q  |  sediment  delivery  in the  whole  basin was  con-
J!  | ;i'  ('  ^•_. '--  ?  Aj  strained to an average of one-half ton per acre to
O__—  50_  )  represent the equi-marginal  restriction policy. In
MILES  ________________________  the  study  by Alt  and  Heady,  one  policy was  to
set  maximum  limits  on  gross  erosion  per  acre
a Piedmont  while another policy was to limit the total amount
b Upper Coastal Plains c  Lower  CoastalPlains  of  sediment  delivered  to  the  reservoir.  They
noted  that  limits  on  total  sediment  delivery
FIGURE  2.  Sediment  Producing Areas  Within  would result in a more efficient solution.
the Altamaha River Basin in Georgia  Efficiency  of  a  policy  can  be  measured  in
I  ,  i  ,____  ~____________terms  of total basin net income per unit of sedi-
ment  abatement.  That  is,  given  alternative
policies which generate equal abatement, the one of comparable  agronomic and erodibility  charac-  p  w  g  e  teristics.6 Two  of the  SRG's  (  A and  B) wee l-  providing  the  largest  net  income  for  the  whole teristics.6 Two  Of the  SRG's (A and  B)  were  lo- cated  in. the  Piedmont  province  and  five  of  the  basin is  the most  efficient  policy.  The  distribu- cated  in the Piedmont  province  and five  of the tion of costs provides the means by which equity SRG's (C through  G) were in the Coastal  Plains  tion of costs  provides the means by which equity regi  T  ros  c  ere  e coa  c  n  can be measured.  In this study,  the distribution region.  The crops  considered were corn, cotton,  of costs  imposed  on  each  SRG is  developed  for
peanuts, and soybeans.  Alternative BMP's avail-  ..  e  f peanuts,  and soean.  Alternative BP's a  - both policies. Using the standard deviation of the able  in  the  model  included  straight  or  contour cost  distributions,  the  most  equitable  policy  is row farming with or without terraces  under con-  the one  hih results  in te l  t s  d  . ,°  . ....~  . . .r\  \  the one which  results in the lowest  standard de- ventional  or conservation  tillage methods.  Only  viation.
corn and soybeans  could be grown under conser-
vation  tillage  methods.  Conservation  tillage
yields were assumed  to equal 95 percent of con-  RESULTS
ventional  tillage  yields.  Also,  alternative  two-
year crop rotation  systems were  available.  Corn  Net revenues  and sediment deliveries  derived
and peanuts  could have  a winter  grass cover  of  using the linear programming  model for each of
rye  while  soybeans  could  have  been  double-  the three situations are presented  in Table  1. Im-
cropped  with wheat.  A total of 464  cropping  ac-  pacts from both the equal  and equi-marginal  re-
tivities  were  included  in  the  model.  Crop  strictions  were  more  severe  in  the  Piedmont
acreages  within  each  SRG  were  constrained  to  SRG's (A and B).  This is because the Piedmont is
levels established  in 1979.  If environmental  con-  more erosive and delivers  a higher percentage  of
straints  become  stringent,  cropland  could  be  sediment than the  Coastal Plains.
taken  out of production.  Overall  efficiency  between  the  equal  restric-
Erosion  rates  for  each  production  activity  tions  and  the  equi-marginal  restrictions  can  be
6 An SRG  is not necessarily  a continuous  or contiguous  land area.  Each  SRG corresponds to a major  soil type found within the  basin.  These soil types occur somewhat
haphazardly  throughout  the  basin,  making it  difficult to  delineate  each  one  on  a map  such as  the  one  in Figure  2.  The major  soil  types within  each  SRG  are: A-Cecil;
B-Pacolet;  C-Norfolk;  D-Dothan;  E-Cowarts;  F-Chewacla; and  G-Lakeland.
7 There is  nothing "special"  about restricting  sediment delivery  to  one-half ton  per acre. In fact,  other restriction  levels were  analyzed and  results  from those models
demonstrate  that equi-marginal  restrictions are more efficient and more equitable  than equal restrictions.  To conserve  space, only the one-half ton per acre restriction results
are presented.
8 Applying the restriction to a whole  SRG assumes that all land within that SRG is identical in terms of erosion potential as well as costs  of abatement.  In aggregate  models
such as this one, however,  it is necessary  to make this assumption because focusing on individual production units (or on each acre within the basin)  would be prohibitively
costly.  Soils within  an SRG do have similar environmental  characteristics  such as  slope, erodibility,  and productivity.  It may be useful to consider  the river basin as being
composed  of seven "farms."  Soil similarities are  found within  an SRG,  bqt soil differences  occur between  SRG's.
126TABLE  1.  Net Revenue and Sediment Delivery  TABLE  2.  Per  Acre  Cost  Distributions  from
Per Acre  for  Soil  Resource  Groups  and  for the  Equal Versus  Equi-marginal  Restrictions
Altamaha  River Basin,  1979
Poli cy
a /
~a/~—~i—  ~SRG  Equal  Equi-marginal
Policy_-
/
SRG  Unconstrained  Equal  Equi-marginal  A  27.18  13.
A  27.18  13.70
A  71.65  44.47  57.95  B  24.53  22.76
(4.557)  (.500)  (1.117)  C  0  2.00 C  0.00  2.00
B  34.11  9.58  11.35
(9.028)  (.500)  (.618)  D  0.89  2.00
C  142.92  142.92  140.92  E  3.03  2.00
(.483)  (.483)  (.240)
F  0.41  2.00
D  119.25  118.36  117.25
(.695)  (.500)  (.345)  G  9.56  4.25
E  68.50  65.47  66.50  Basin  5.87  4.34
(1.090)  (.500)  (.542)
Standard  b  11.42  8.01
F  52.78  52.37  50.78  deviation
/
(.555)  (.500)  (.333)
G  30.33  20.77  26.08  a  These costs are derived by subtracting the net revenue of
(1.605)  (.500)  (.782)
16b05/h(7  2a  policy from the net revenue of the baseline  solution.
Basi  - 94.74  88.87  90.40  b  This  value  was  obtained by  using the basin  cost  as the
(1.546)  (.496)  (.500)
mean.
a The  top  number  in  each  row  is  net revenue  per  acre.  l  (C  - Cb)2
Sediment  delivery per acre  is in parentheses.  Both net reve-  Specifically,  s.d.  i = 1  for i =  1, ..., 7
nue  and  sediment  delivery  per acre  are  averages.  Revenue  n
and  delivery for  each  acre  within  a particular  SRG will  de- 
viate from  these averages. viate from  these averages.  where  Ci is  the cost  for the ith  SRG  and  Cb is  the total
b These  basin  averages  are  weighted  by  the  number  of  basin cost.
acres in each  SRG.
TABLE  3.  Land  Use  Under  Equal  Versus
Equi-marginal  Restrictions  determined  by  observing  the  basin net revenue  Equi-marginal  Restriction
per acre values. An average savings of $1.53/acre  SRG  Straight  Contour  Contour  Unused
can  be  obtained  by  applying  restrictions  equi-  Rows,  Rows,  Rows,  Land
Conventional  Conventional  Conservation marginally.  Farmers in the basin aggregate could  Tillage  Tillage  Tillage
save  over  1.5  million dollars with  equi-marginal
restrictions.  Equity  aspects  between  the  two  (acres)-------------------------------
policies  are revealed by analyzing costs for each  A  0  11,200  70,031  38,069
SRG  (Table  2).  The  equi-marginal  restrictions  ()  (26,095)  (93250)  (0)
benefit SRG's A, B, E, and G. However, SRG's,  B  0  3,000  4,405  28,395 (0)  (3,000)  (6,500)  (26,300) C,  D,  and  F  must incur  greater  costs.  The cost
C  253,500  0  0  0 distribution among the SRG's  is more even with  (0)  (253,500)  (0)  (0
the  equi-marginal  restrictions,  as  evidenced  by  151 957  123,343  0  0
the lower  standard  deviation.  Thus,  the  results  (0)  (275,300)  (0)  (0)
suggest  that  equi-marginal  restrictions  create  a  E  0  170,700  0  0
more efficient and equitable  solution to the NSP  )  (170,700)  (0)  (0)
problem than uniform  restrictions.  F  41,743  10,857  0  0
It is interesting  to note  what BMP's  were  in-
G  0  44,562  62,038  7,500 corporated to meet sediment delivery restrictions  (0)  (102,000)  (4,600)  (7,500)
(Table  3).  In  the  baseline  solution,  all  land was
planted in straight rows with conventional tillage.  a The  top number in  each row corresponds  to equal restric-
A  one-half  ton  per  acre  restriction  applied  to  tions.  The  number  in  parentheses  corresponds  to  equi-
each SRG resulted  in conservation  tillage meth-  marginal restrictions.
ods being used as well as land being taken out of
crop production  in SRG's  A, B,  and G.  Contour  whenever  possible  and  terraces  were  not  con-
rows with conventional tillage were present in all  structed in any  solutions.9
areas  except  SRG  C.  Soybeans-wheat  double
cropping was used extensively but winter covers  CONCL
of rye were only used in  SRG E.  Equi-marginal  LU
restrictions  allowed  more land to stay in produc-  Given  that policy-makers  strive for efficiency
tion  and  caused  all  land  to  be  under  contour  and  equity,  economists  must  consider  both  as-
rows.  Two-year  crop  rotations  were  used  pects  when  analyzing a proposed  policy.  In this
9 Other solutions  which allowed  cost-sharing for terrace construction were  obtained. As the cost-sharing rate increased,  more terraces were constructed,  especially under
the equal restriction  policy.
127study,  theory  was  reviewed  and  analysis  was  this  situation,  the  most  efficient  solution  would
conducted  demonstrating  that in the absence  of  be  to  locate  the  damaged  areas,  locate  the
administrative  costs,  an equi-marginal  approach  sources  of those damages,  and restrict  sediment
is  more  efficient  and  equitable  than  equal  per  delivery  from  those  sources.  As  Moldenhauer
acre restrictions.  When compared  to an equal re-  and Onstad point out, pollution  control may  be
striction policy,  an equi-marginal restriction pol-  required  at watershed  outlets,  farm boundaries,
icy  allows  high-level  polluters  to  deliver  more  or  the  farm  itself.  Depending  on  the  circum-
sediment,  but requires  low-level polluters  to de-  stances, levels of control at these three locations
liver  less  sediment.  If  differential  restrictions  could  vary.  Efficient  minimization  of offsite
which equate marginal costs could be determined  damages from NSP requires knowledge  concern-
at the  farm level  (or even  at a sub-basin  level),  ing the pollutant source. Any NSP control policy
then  costs  would  be  distributed  more  evenly  should require  only sources  causing  damages to
among  the  polluters,  and  aggregate  basin  costs  incur costs. Results from this study would be dif-
would  decline.  Administrative  costs,  although  ferent if locations of damaged  areas and sources
not  estimated  in  this  study,  could  be  different  of  that  damage  had  been  incorporated  in  the
under these two policies. Information  concerning  model.  The  theoretical  conclusions,  however,
administrative  costs  could  help  policy-makers  would  still  be  valid.  That  is,  equi-marginal  re-
decide on the most desirable policy.  strictions  applied  to  sources  causing  damages
In  this  research,  two  assumptions  were  im-  would  be  more  efficient  and  equitable  (for  that
plicitly used which, if false,  could alter the empir-  subset  of  sources  causing  damages)  than  equal
ical  results.  These  assumptions  were:  (1) dam-  per  acre  restrictions.  Certainly,  more  effort  is
ages from a unit of sediment  in one location are  needed  in determining  areas where water quality
equal to damages from other units of sediment in  damage  is present,  quantitatively  or monetarily
any other location,  and (2) each acre of cropland  measuring  the damage,  and locating  the sources
within the basin causes sediment  damage.  Possi-  of  damage.  These  activities  might  require  sub-
bly,  in  a  large  river  basin,  sediment  damage  stantial  administrative  costs,  but  could  reduce
would occur unevenly.  Also,  the  sources  of the  aggregate  pollution control costs borne by farm-
damage would vary from location to location.  In  ers.
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